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Abstract
The actions of Malware are often controlled through uniform communications mechanisms, which are
regularly changing to evade detection techniques and remain prolific. Though geographically dispersed,
malware-infected nodes being controlled for a common purpose can be viewed as a logically joint
network, now loosely referred to as a botnet. The evolution of the mechanisms or processes for
controlling the networks of malware-infected nodes may be indicative of their sophistication relative to a
point of inception or discovery (if inception time is unknown).
A sampling of botnet related malware at different points of inception or discovery can provide
accurate representations of the sophistication variance of command and control processes. To accurately
measure a sampling, a matrix of sophistication, deemed the Complexity Matrix (CM), was created to
categorize the signifying characteristics of Command and Control (C&C) processes amongst a
historically-diverse selection of bot binaries.
In this paper, a survey of botnets is conducted to identify C&C characteristics that accurately represent
the level of sophistication being implemented within a specified time frame. The results of the survey are
collected in a CM and used to generate a subsequent roadmap of C&C milestones.

1. Introduction
Network-based Covert Channels (NCCs) have been used as discrete end-to-end data transfer mediums for
botnet communications. C&C operations rely on NCCs to remotely manage and update resources while
evading detection mechanisms. An evolution of detection mechanisms directly impacts the evolution of
NCCs used for such purposes, and as such, methods of C&C operations have vastly changed over time.
The objective of the subsequent work is to identify and quantify the sophistication variance of C&C
processes throughout a comparative analysis of multiple botnets created at different points in history. This
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analysis will effectively prove or disprove that the sophistication or complexity of C&C methods are
increasing over time.
Bots may rely on C&C communications, for the distribution of instructions, for routine updating
purposes, and to remain effective and evasive. These communications serve as the lifeline to a Botmaster,
or the entity managing the botnet, and as such are typically very important to the overall success of a
botnet. Anti-malware solutions pose a significant threat to the longevity of C&C communications, so
methods of evasion are regularly implemented to enable bots to operate unscathed.
The architecture of a botnet will vastly affect the methods of C&C that are implemented, and in some
situations will directly affect the complexity of the C&C processes. A thorough understanding of the
major botnet designs is thus a prerequisite to C&C evaluation. Botnets can be defined as either
centralized, decentralized, or hybrid in design [22, 32], but only centralized and decentralized
architectures will be explored in this research. The designs are briefly defined, below, and are explored in
greater depth in section 2.2.


Centralized: Receives or retrieves all C&C communications from a master node (or nodes) in a
master/slave design (Master





Bot).

Decentralized: Receives or retrieves some or all C&C communications from a series of peers in a
peer-to-peer (P2P) design (Bot



Bot).

Historically, the centralized architecture has been a widely adopted design for successful botnet
implementations. C&C master servers can be viewed as a single point of failure despite the potential to
have intermediary nodes relaying communications [22]. In contrast, a decentralized design focuses on
C&C methods being delivered through peers (other Bots), and effectively eliminates a central point of
failure [3, 13]. A decentralized design must therefore rely upon a mechanism to discover or communicate
with other peers, and may be much more difficult in practice to implement. The effectiveness of each
design truly depends upon the methods of obscuring or securing the C&C traffic from detection.
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In addition to being measured on architectural style, C&C communications will be measured by other
distinguishable features. Distinguishable features will be categorized under one of the following highlevel capability offerings: high availability and fault tolerance, authentication and non-repudiation,
encryption methods, evasion tactics, transport protocols, and application protocols.
A broad analysis of C&C methods, adopted by well-known botnets throughout history, is required to
interpret their overall complexity. This work seeks to do just that, by categorizing the characteristics of
the C&C method into a complexity matrix (CM) and generating metrics from the collected data. As such,
the analysis required two methods of evaluation to create complexity measurements:
(1)

A logical deconstruction of C&C processes based upon prior research

(2)

A physical evaluation of C&C processes on selected Bots, where prior research is missing or
inadequate

The work herein produces a roadmap of measurable advancements in C&C methods through the
evaluation of several botnet variants. The roadmap and supporting documentation will explicitly prove
sophistication advancement as time progresses. Ideally, the outcomes of this project will enable a
researcher to quickly and easily identify when a C&C method surfaced, relative to the malware that used
it. In addition to being time-bound, the maturity of a specific C&C method will also be measurable.
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2. Related Work &Background
In a sampling of prior research, major attention was paid towards innovative techniques for detecting
C&C traffic or, alternatively, performing static analysis on particular C&C technologies to understand
their functionality and potential applications. Functional advancements and varying levels of
sophistication are documented in such efforts, which help identify a period of performance for a particular
C&C method.

2.1 Related Work
Lashkari et al. introduced a broad overview of various prominent botnets [4], but the work lacks specifics
on the capabilities and technologies leveraged by the botnet authors. The work presented in [4] is also
lacking tangible evidence to prove or disprove advancements in C&C techniques. Norman introduced a
similar approach at wide-scale botnet evaluation, but purely tailored his work towards the logical
deconstruction and evaluation of P2P botnets [3]. Norman does, however, present a very detailed
narrative on the history and direction of botnets in general.
This work improves upon a broad botnet survey and hones in on specifics of the C&C methods
employed by Botmasters. To supplement the work performed in this survey, two other categories of prior
research were leveraged for their specific vantage point on botnet functionality: botnet detection and
botnet evaluation.
2.1.1 Botnet Detection
Botnets may elicit specific characteristics that can be used for detection purposes. Various detection
methods are presented in prior research [5, 6, 24, 27, 29, 30, 32, 40], either as novel approaches or as
sources of comparison for already available detection methods. This research methodology does not
typically focus on detecting a single botnet family, but more generally provides a plausible basis for the
detection of multiple botnets. Such research inevitably reveals many specifics of botnet C&C methods
indirectly.
4

2.1.2 Botnet Evaluation
Evaluation tends to focus on the dissection of botnet families in an effort to understand the underlying
technologies utilized by Botmasters. C&C methods are evaluated based upon specific protocol
characteristics and design features in the chosen work [2-4, 7, 9-13, 21-23, 26, 28, 33, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44].
Such approaches directly reveal specifics of C&C methods.

2.2 Botnet C&C Architecture
Each botnet selected for evaluation in this research receives or retrieves C&C communications in either a
centralized or decentralized fashion. Strictly speaking, a centralized architecture requires C&C
communications to propagate from centralized masters (C&C server) to slaves (Bots). A decentralized
architecture would thus purely rely upon peers (Bots) to receive and retrieve C&C communications.
There are, however, designs that go beyond the traditional understanding of centralized or decentralized.
Thus, we have several designs presented in the sampling of botnets chosen in this research.
Modern malware may introduce the separation of duties amongst different nodes in a hierarchical
fashion. This hierarchical format exists in both Centralized and Decentralized architectures, and the
naming conventions used to identify those roles are listed below and used throughout the document.


Subnodes: The lowest tier of a hierarchical design; the bot or zombie computers



Supernodes: The next intermediary tier of nodes after subnodes; bots equipped with more
functionality or responsibilities



Subcontrollers: The next intermediary tier of nodes after supernodes; services deployed to
managed systems to hide C&C servers and perform basic C&C functions for lower layers



C&C Operations Center: The highest tier of a hierarchical design; services deployed to manage
and delegate responsibilities to the lower tiers, directly operated by a Botmaster
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2.2.1 Centralized Architecture
A centralized architecture follows a master/slave topology, where a central authority (master) is
responsible for the actions of its slaves. A legacy implementation (Fig. 1) of the centralized architecture
follows a very simple one-to-many relationship. However, the addition of intermediary nodes to perform
selective C&C functions represents a delegation of responsibilities and increases the difficulty in
identifying the central authority for a botnet. The method of introducing layers of intermediary C&C
nodes to create a more scalable, robust botnet is identified as the next-generation centralized design
(Figure 2).

Legacy Centralized Design
Subnodes (Bots)

C&C Operations Center

Figure 1: A Legacy Centralized Design with co-located C&C servers & a single Botmaster
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Next-generation Design
Subnodes (Bots)

Supernodes

Subcontrollers

C&C Operations Center

Figure 2: A Next-generation Centralized Design utilizing Supernodes and Subcontrollers for hierarchical C&C

2.2.2 Decentralized Architecture
A decentralized architecture follows a P2P topology, where no central authority is directly responsible for
the actions of a peer. A basic implementation of the decentralized architecture follows a simple many-tomany relationship, where participating bots may have multiple connections to other participating bots at
any given point in time. A full P2P (Fig. 3) design purely relies on its peers (Bots) for C&C instruction
dissemination, but enables a Botmaster to distribute C&C instructions to his entire botnet through any
given Bot. A hierarchical P2P design (Fig. 4) utilizes P2P communications for the use of specific C&C
purposes, and introduces layers of hierarchical control points for extended C&C distribution and more
robust functionality.
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Full P2P Design

Figure 3: A Full P2P Decentralized Design, utilizing partial mesh P2P relationships & a single Botmaster

Hierarchical P2P Design
Subnodes (Bots)

Supernodes

Subcontrollers

C&C Operations Center

Figure 4: A Hierarchical P2P Decentralized Design, using partial mesh P2P relationships between Subnodes and utilizing Supernodes
and Subcontrollers for hierarchical C&C
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2.3 Botnet Selections & Overview
The growing number of botnet families presents a challenge when identifying an accurate subset of
botnets that are representative of a given era. Thus, the botnets selected for evaluation in this project were
chosen based upon the significance of one or more of the following properties:
(1)

The proliferation or wide-scale effect on the Internet (and thus the users of)

(2)

The precedence set by, or the novel use of, a C&C technique

(3)

The period of performance of a specific botnet

By limiting the selection of botnet examples in this fashion, a manageable scope for botnet evaluation is
created. However, the limited scope does not hinder the ability to accurately represent historical C&C
sophistication variance.
To satisfy the requirement to represent a full spectrum of botnet C&C advancements, fourteen botnet
examples were chosen after evaluating their respective C&C methods against the selection criteria. The
following subsections will provide introductory details on the selected botnets.
2.3.1 Agobot
Agobot is a name given to a large family of botnet variants that were identified by Sophos [48] in October
of 2002. The Agobot malware source code was released to the general public under the GNU General
Public License, version 2 (GPL v2), spawning many subsequent botnets. Based on this open distribution,
Agobot also may collectively refer to Gaobot, which Symantec first reported on January 13, 2004 [51].
2.3.2 Asprox
The Asprox botnet is comprised of spambots, used for the sole purpose of sending unsolicited email [42]
and phishing attacks. The botnet was discovered and categorized as a Trojan by Symantec on June 8,
2007 [49].
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2.3.3 Bagle
The Bagle botnet is comprised of spambots, used for the sole purpose of sending unsolicited email.
According to M86 Security, Bagle surfaced in early 2004 [15, 16]. It is characterized by its ability to act
as a proxy server for the relay of spam to its final destination, but can ultimately serve other purposes as
required.
2.3.4 Bobax
Bobax is malware used primarily for spamming purposes. According to F-Secure [45], the botnet was
discovered on May 16, 2004. Much like other spamming botnets, it is characterized by its ability to act as
a proxy server for the relay of spam to its final destination.
2.3.5 Conficker
Conficker is a worm that exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Server service and provides
several methods of propagation to other vulnerable hosts. The overall objective of the worm is not clearly
understood, beyond the act of infecting other nodes. Microsoft reports that the first variant of Conficker
was reported on November 21, 2008 [25].
2.3.6 iKee
iKee is a worm that propagates to vulnerable Apple iOS devices purportedly for the sake of phishing and
information mining [11]. The malware was discovered on November 19, 2009 [11].
2.3.7 GTbot
GTbot, or Global Threat Bot, is the name given to a wide variety of malware with similar IRC-based
botnet characteristics. Prior research by Canavan documents the introduction of GTbot variants in late
2000 [44].
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2.3.8 Nugache
Nugache is malware utilized mainly for information mining [53], but has the capacity to be used for other
nefarious purposes. Early variants of Nugache were discovered on April 30, 2006 [53].
2.3.9 Peacomm
Peacomm, otherwise known as Storm, is a multi-stage infection that is largely used for the generation of
spam and DDoS attacks. Symantec identified the malware on January 19, 2007 [50].
2.3.10 Phatbot
Phatbot is an Agobot variant [51] that was detected by Symantec on November 21, 2003 as
W32.HLLW.Gaobot.gen [52]. Phatbot inherits the capabilities of earlier variants, but is equipped with a
larger exploit toolkit for compromising vulnerable machines.
2.3.11 SDbot
SDbot is remote control and administration malware used for information mining, DDoS attacks and
infecting other nodes to perform similar functions. SDbot’s existence became known by Symantec on
April 30, 2002 [17].
2.3.12 Sinit
Sinit is remote control and administration malware purportedly used for the distribution of other malware
[46]. Symantec first discovered the threat on October 9, 2003 [18].
2.3.13 Waledac
Waledac is multifunctional piece of malware that spreads and infects using various different attack
vectors. The malware is utilized mainly for generation of spam, emerging in November 2008 [6, 43, 54].
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2.3.14 Zeus
Zeus is the name given to a large crimeware suite used to create and control customized bot binaries. The
name has become synonymous with the bots generated from the various versions of the Zeus suite, but
this is not an accurate identifier for any single binary. The creation time of the crimeware is not known
with absolute precision, but the kit is readily used as of this writing (August, 2012).

3. Evaluation Methodology
A sampling of botnet variants is evaluated for the existence of specific features to enable stealthy
communications in their respective C&C topology. The analysis begins with a literature review of
research performed on all of the identified botnet variants and completed with manual network traffic
analysis as returned from a machine infected with a bot binary.
The manual analysis is utilized to enforce prior research and support statements made in this research.
In the event that a bot binary was unattainable, the generated CM identifies this and utilizes the details of
prior research.

3.1 Manual C&C Evaluation Tools & Processes
3.1.1 Infection Point
All malware was installed and executed on an unpatched version of the Microsoft Windows XP operating
system (OS). A physical system was used to host the OS to avoid the possibility of the bot binary
behaving differently if operated in a virtual environment. The only modification to the guest operating
system was the installation of network and video device drivers.
A dedicated residential broadband connection was utilized as the connection medium for the infection
point. A publicly routable IP address was assigned to the machine via DHCP.
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3.1.2 Imaging
The Ghost 4 Linux (G4L) project was leveraged for the bare metal backup and restore of the system
utilized as the infection point. The physical host was configured to boot using the Intel PXE protocol and
download the unadulterated XP image using TFTP; these processes were executed for every malware
review cycle.
3.1.3 Packet Analysis
Packet analysis of the chosen malware was performed using Tcpdump and Wireshark from a host running
Debian Linux 6.0. The host shared a physical hub with the infection point, but was forced into
promiscuous mode for raw network access to the collision domain.
3.1.4 Evaluation Criteria
Due to the number of malware variants selected for this research, limitations were placed on the
evaluation to only relevant C&C details. The evaluation was limited in time and scope.
Each botnet evaluation lasted 4 hours, limiting the total time exhausted to a maximum of 56 hours.
The inability to directly evaluate two of the botnet variants further reduced this value to 48 hours. This
time does not include the time spent configuring the lab environment or reviewing the packet traces.
Several of the selected botnets implement a form of transport encryption or file-based encryption, but
were not reverse engineered as part of this research. This restricts the evaluation to only glean the
information that is human readable by means of direct packet analysis.
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3.2 Lab Topology
Fig. 5 is a representation of the different topologies used in this work. The lab environment was separated
for three different processes for the physical evaluation:
- Imaging: The bare-metal XP installation
- Discovery: Finding suitable malware for evaluation and performing signature-based identification
- Infection: Installing the malware on the infection point
IMAGING

G4L/TFTP/DHCP

Infection Point

DISCOVERY

INFECTION

Infection Point

Analyzer

Internet

Residential ISP

SEP 12.X

Internet

Residential ISP

Ubuntu 12.04/Usenet/Web

Figure 5: The three separate high-level processes and their respective topologies

3.3 Botnet C&C Evaluation
After conducting thorough research on fourteen botnet families, 1312 examples of botnet-related malware
were sourced using Usenet and a variety of sites hosted on the .box.sk network. All malware samples
were downloaded using a live distribution of Ubuntu Linux (12.04) and transported to a Windows 7 x64
virtual machine utilizing Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) for signature-based identification of the
malware. The actual IP addresses of the externally hosted C&C nodes or botnet peers are not recorded as

14

part of the evaluation, as the research focuses purely on methods of C&C communications. The first three
octets of the IP address associated with the infection point and the destination C&C master/peer are
replaced with x’s in the tabular data.
The observations of the malware are supplemented with references to prior research. The behaviors
associated with a specific bot are verified through the research of others. In the case of the iKee iOS
botnet, a working example could not be tested due to resource constraints, and thus the evaluation purely
relies on the in depth research of iKee.B conducted by Porras et al. [11]. Additionally, only a number of
the bots were capable of establishing C&C relationships with remote hosts presumably due to the removal
or abandonment of key elements of their infrastructure.
Both the expected behaviors of the malware, dissected from prior research, and the actual observations
of the malware C&C communications are generalized below. The CM presented in section 3.4 contains a
complete list of features that identify C&C functionality for the chosen malware.
3.3.1 Agobot
Expected Behavior
Agobot implements a Legacy Centralized Design for C&C communications, based upon the descriptions
of the malware in [12, 44]. Agobot variants attempt to utilize Internet Relay Chat (IRC) as the common
method of C&C communications, as confirmed in [7, 27, 48] without implementing encryption or
obfuscation of data at rest or data in motion. Agobot is expected to implement a custom syntax for the
execution of actions as directed by a Botmaster [8].
Observed Behavior
The Agobot selection was identified as W32.Gaobot.BUU utilizing SEP. This Agobot variant attempted
to utilize IRC as the common method of C&C communications over TCP/6667 (Table 1), but failed to
complete a simple TCP three-way handshake to the remote host. After random intervals of time, the bot
would attempt to connect to the same remote host, but the three-way handshake never completed.
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Symptoms suggest that the downloaded binary is hardcoded with a C&C server IP address, and does not
attempt to implement any forms of high availability.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

10

11.137147

x.x.x.66

TCP

X.X.X.54

58

54906 > 6667 [SYN] Seq=0

Table 1: Infected node attempting to initiate a connection on TCP/6667.

3.3.2 Asprox
Expected Behavior
Asprox utilizes the HTTP protocol for Next-generation Centralized C&C communications, without the
advent of transport layer encryption. It does, however, retrieve C&C instructions in an encrypted template
file which must be decrypted and interpreted by the recipient bot [10]. Outbound C&C communications
are expected to occur on either TCP/80 or TCP/82 [15, 49]. Based upon the research by M86 Security
Labs [42], Asprox bots are distributed with a list of domain names for initial C&C bootstrapping. The
initial check-in process occurs with a HTTP/1.1 POST request to a remote host, followed by a HTTP/1.1
GET request to download an encrypted file with a .BIN file extension [10, 46]. The authoritative response
for the given name lookup during the initial connection requests will return one of a series of IP addresses
due to the use of double-flux DNS [42], which also indicates that responsible C&C servers are well
protected from plain view.
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Observed Behavior
The Asprox example was identified as Trojan.Asprox utilizing SEP. Seconds after installation, TCP SYN
probes are issued against several well-known search engines (Table.2), which appear to be the
connectivity checks identified in [15, 16, 46]. Within 60 seconds of running for the first time, the bot
performed a name lookup for a seemingly random FQDN (Table.3).
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

14

2.077903

x.x.x.66

TCP

74.125.228.97

58

15

2.082287

74.125.228.97

TCP

x.x.x.66

58

16

4.212670

x.x.x.66

TCP

98.138.253.109

58

17

5.047804

98.138.253.109

TCP

x.x.x.66

58

43756 > http [SYN]
Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0
MSS=1460
http > 43756 [SYN,
ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
Win=14300 Len=0
MSS=1430
50799 > http [SYN]
Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0
MSS=1460
http > 50799 [SYN,
ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
Win=8192 Len=0
MSS=1460

Table 2: TCP SYN scans initiated against Google.com and Yahoo.com.

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

31

58.183426

x.x.x.66

DNS

x.x.x.81

83

32

59.656053

x.x.x.81

DNS

x.x.x.66

119

Standard query 0x0004
A xxxxx.ru
Standard query
response 0x0004 A
x.x.x.19

Table 3: Name lookup for C&C resource.

After the IP address of the remote host was resolved, the machine contacted the remote host utilizing
TCP/80 and issued a standard HTTP/1.1 POST request for a file with a .PHP extension (Table 4). This
behavior mimics the behavior identified in [10]. After a period of approximately thirty minutes, the
malware requested the download of another file with a .PHP extension using a HTTP/1.1 GET request
(Table 5). The extension of the retrieved file differed from the expected behavior. However, the contents
of the file were still encrypted. Outbound traffic on TCP/25 became evident shortly after the download of
the encrypted .PHP file, indicating that the bot was now equipped with a spamming template and
instructions to perform the process of spamming.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

41

78.183426

x.x.x.66

HTTP

X.X.X.121

517

POST /ckl/stanje.php HTTP/1.1

Table 4: HTTP/1.1 POST check-in.
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No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

1437

1837.783528

x.x.x.66

HTTP

X.X.X.97

540

GET /ckl/bar.php HTTP/1.1

Table 5: HTTP/1.1 GET request.

3.3.3 Bagle
Expected Behavior
Much like Asprox, Bagle utilizes the HTTP protocol for C&C communications, without the advent of
transport layer encryption [19]. Initial check-in requests are performed against a series of hard-coded
URLs with a HTTP/1.1 GET request on TCP/80 against a file with a .PHP file extension [1]. The
malware then begins listening for connections on a series of TCP ports, as identified in [20]. Bagle does,
however, retrieve C&C instructions in an encrypted file, which must be decrypted and interpreted by the
recipient bot [19]. Unlike Asprox, it uses a Legacy Centralized Design for C&C communications.
Observed Behavior
The selected variant of Bagle is identified as W32.Beagle.AV@mm by SEP. The infected machine began
performing name lookups on a series of FQDNs immediately after installation (Table 6). This name
lookup behavior mimicked the expected behavior identified in prior research [1,19]. Many of the URLs
were likely offline, as a connection wasn’t built to a remote host until several lookups were performed.
The machine fetched a .PHP file utilizing a standard HTTP/1.1 GET request (Table 7). The same standard
procedure is purportedly performed when downloading an updated version of the bot binary [19], but was
not witnessed in testing.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

22

8.691871

x.x.x.66

DNS

x.x.x.81

78

24

9.141238

x.x.x.81

DNS

x.x.x.66

132

27

9.470919

x.x.x.66

DNS

x.x.x.81

83

28

9.480868

x.x.x.81

DNS

x.x.x.66

139

Standard query
xxxxxxx.com
Standard query
No such name
Standard query
xxxxxx.in.cc
Standard query
A x.x.x.122

0x0004

response 0xec47
0x0004

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

107

25.632279

x.x.x.66

HTTP

X.X.X.230

437

GET /brg.php HTTP/1.1

18

A

response 0x0004

Table 6: A snippet of name lookup failures/successes.

Table 7: HTTP/1.1 GET request (similar to Asprox).

A

Similar to Asprox, the infected node began opening outbound connections on TCP/25 in a typical
fashion to spam. However, no further HTTP connections were discovered during the evaluation. The
infected machine did, however, acknowledge TCP SYN scans from remote hosts that targeted
TCP/33112, indicating that the malware began listening on TCP/33112 (Table 8). This was confirmed on
the infection point by using the command-line application NETSTAT to view listening sockets (Table 9).
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

914

1233.698020

x.x.x.102

TCP

x.x.x.66

58

917

1235.321910

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.102

60

46752 > 33112 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
33112 > 46752 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
Ack=1 Win=14600 Len=0

Table 8: TCP SYN against TCP/33112 with TCP AC from infection point.

Prot.

Local Addr.

Foreign Addr.

State

PID

TCP

X.X.X.66:33112

0.0.0.0:0

LISTENING

3412

Table 9: Using NETSTAT on the infection point to verify a listening state on TCP/33112.

3.3.4 Bobax
Expected Behavior
A Legacy Centralized Design is used by Bobax for C&C communications using HTTP or HTTPS as its
transport medium. C&C traffic is sent encrypted or unencrypted to a C&C server over TCP/80 or
TCP/447 respectively [38, 48]. Bobax utilizes port scanning to identify vulnerable hosts listening on
TCP/5000 (UPnP) [45], and launches a remote exploit on the node to execute the Bobax malware loader.
Bobax leverages a DGA to resolve an address of a C&C server and remain resilient.
Observed Behavior
The selected variant of Bobax is identified as W32.Bobax.B by SEP. After being infected with the Bobax
malware, the machine began performing name lookups for a series of FQDNs. A series of TCP SYN
requests were issued against the IP addresses returned from the name lookups. The remote hosts appear to
be inactive, as TCP three-way handshake never completed. The malware remained dormant after these
attempts to resolve inactive FQDNs.
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3.3.5 Conficker
Expected Behavior
Conficker variants may utilize a decentralized or centralized architecture depending on the build of
Conficker being evaluated and the circumstances that the bot is operating under [2]. Early variants of
Conficker utilized only a DGA to resolve the addresses of C&C servers, whereas later variants were
equipped with added capabilities to perform Internet-wide port scanning and various other methods to
detect, exploit and build P2P relationships with other vulnerable nodes. Porras et al. discover that C&C
communications are possible over UDP and TCP, and the payload in either situation is digitally signed
and encrypted. Digital signage is performed using a 4096 byte RSA key and the MD6 hashing algorithm.
Data encryption is performed with the RC4 stream cipher, and an encryption routine can be executed
several times to add further layers of encryption [26]. When operating in a centralized architecture,
Conficker will communicate on TCP/80, but will dynamically assign a communication port when
operating in P2P mode. P2P port bindings are based upon the open ports discovered or requested during
the port scan discovery phase [24].
Observed Behavior
The selected variant of Conficker is identified as W32.Downadup.E by SEP. Within ten minutes of the
installation of the Conficker malware, the infected machine began scanning randomized IP addresses in
the public address space using TCP SYN requests. Porras et al. describe similar behavior in their analysis
of the Conficker C variant [26] as its method of building a P2P relationship with other Conficker peers in
its discovery phase (Table 10). Unlike the prior research, however, a TCP connection was never built with
a remote host. During the scanning process, TCP SYN packets were sent to several prominent websites,
in what appears to be connectivity checks (Table 11). Beyond the constant port scanning cycle of the
malware, no other established connections were observed.
Based upon the observed scanning behavior and the signature detection by SEP, the chosen binary of
Conficker is ultimately a P2P variant. Prior research thus serves as the major source of input for the CM.
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No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

1022

587.658121

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.118

58

1023

591.189130

x.x.x.118

TCP

x.x.x.66

60

1024

592.665070

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.118

58

1026

593.341012

x.x.x.118

TCP

x.x.x.66

60

51718 > 45597 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
45597 > 51718[RST, ACK]
Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
51718 > 18343 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
18343 > 51718[RST, ACK]
Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

1057

643.172901

x.x.x.66

TCP

1061

644.138873

x.x.x.66

TCP

<< Truncated >>
x.x.x.43
x.x.x.43

58

55670 > 50590 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
55670 > 15851 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460

58

Table 10: TCP SYN probes launched from the infection point to random IP public IP addresses. In the first example, TCP RST
responses are received, whereas the responses are being filtered for the second example.

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

1022

1422.497360

x.x.x.66

TCP

65.55.206.228

58

1023

1424.176123

65.55.206.228

TCP

x.x.x.66

58

53990 > http [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
http > 53990 [SYN, ACK]
Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8190
Len=0 MSS=1460

Table 11: TCP SYN scan initiated against MSN.com.

3.3.6 iKee
Expected Behavior
IKee.B utilizes a Legacy Centralized Design for C&C communications and, unlike other botnets
evaluated in this work, specifically targets a mobile platform (Apple iOS) [11]. Utilizing HTTP as a
transport medium, iKee.B sends a specially crafted GET request to a hard-coded IP address of a C&C
server over TCP/80 to begin its bootstrap process [28]. The initial bootstrap process is comprised of
downloading and executing various UNIX shell scripts on the infected handheld device. Due to the use of
a hard-coded C&C server address, removing the C&C servers behind the IP address will cripple the
botnet.
Observed Behavior
The resources to perform static packet analysis on the iKee.B botnet were not available. Furthermore, the
research led by Porras et al. [11] identifies that the C&C servers for this malware are no longer active.
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3.3.7 GTbot
Expected Behavior
Per the research presented by Canavan in [44], the Aladinz family of infections is a derivative of GTbot,
and was amongst the assortment of malware collected prior to the manual evaluation. Such variants utilize
a Legacy Centralized Design for IRC-based C&C communications, typically over TCP/6667 [12], but can
vary based upon the infection. A mIRC client is bundled with the malware to retrieve customized C&C
instructions [44] from the remote host due to the added functionality and powerful scripting capabilities
[35, 36] available to a Botmaster.
Observed Behavior
The selected variant of GTbot is identified as Backdoor.IRC.Aladinz.B by SEP. Despite its age, the
malware was capable of connecting to a remote IRC server using TCP/6667 and performing a simple
login routine. The login routine utilized a randomized string of alphanumeric characters as the NICK and
USER variables (Table 12) for the authentication phase, and responded to the standard PING message
from the remote host with a PONG message (Table 13). Shortly thereafter, the bot appeared to join a
channel named #MRZ by issuing the command /join #MRZ (Table 14). The IRC connection remained in
an idle mode for the duration of evaluation, with only PING and PONG messages exchanged to keep the
connection alive at 100 second intervals.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

15

3.020929

x.x.x.66

IRC

x.x.x.4

106

Request (NICK) (USER)
NICK :2373abxd
USER :2373abxd

Table 12: IRC NICK/USER authentication to remote C&C server.

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

104
105

39.691632
39.780873

x.x.x.66
x.x.x.4

IRC
IRC

x.x.x.4
x.x.x.66

86
131

Request (PING)
Response (PONG)

Table 13: Initial IRC PING/PONG exchange.

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

33

10.234800

x.x.x.66

IRC

x.x.x.4

114

42

16.049790

x.x.x.4

IRC

x.x.x.66

148

Request (JOIN)
Request: JOIN #MRZ :
Response (JOIN)
Response:
2343abxd@x.x.x.66.x.cox.net JOIN
#MRZ

Table 14: IRC channel join on channel #MRZ.
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3.3.8 Nugache
Expected Behavior
Dittrich and Dietrich [37, 39] detail two C&C architectures present in different revisions of Nugache –
centralized and decentralized. Nugache variants that operate with a centralized architecture rely on the
traditional use of IRC for a C&C mechanism. The focus for this research, however, will be on Nugache
variants that employ P2P C&C communications.
Nugache infected peers rely upon a seed list of 22 other infected nodes [9] for its P2P bootstrap
process. C&C communications utilize random, high-numbered TCP ports for outbound communications
and encrypt their payload using 256-bit AES (Rijndael) session keys [13]. Session keys are exchanged
between other peers referenced in the seed list [13] using ephemeral (short lifetime) RSA keys ranging in
size from 64 to 128 bytes [39]. Dittrich and Dietrich further identify the AES block cipher mode as
Output Feedback (OFB) [39], which effectively changes a block cipher into a stream cipher, making it
ideal for networked communications. Upon a successful P2P connection, an updated list of peers is
purportedly downloaded from a peer or series of peers [13, 32, 39].
Observed Behavior
The selected variant of Nugache is identified as W32.Nugache.A@mm.B by SEP, but did not illicit the
characteristics as identified by Symantec [53]. Namely, Symantec identifies this variant as utilizing IRC
over TCP/8 for C&C communications. This, however, was not the case. The only activities observed
during the evaluation were TCP SYN requests against 9 unique IP addresses on randomized ports, which
were never retried after the timeout period had lapsed (Table 15). The limited information gathered from
the observation indicates a P2P variant of Nugache.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

911

86.138892

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.113

58

912

86.605351

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.84

58

913

86.694362

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.97

58

56133 > 53126 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
56133 > 47813 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
56133 > 34521 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460

<< Truncated >>
Table 15: A snippet of TCP SYN probes observed by the Nugache variant.
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3.3.9 Peacomm
Expected Behavior
Peacomm resembles a decentralized architecture, due to its custom implementation of the Overnet P2P
protocol [2], but utilizes hierarchy in C&C communications. Thus, this is categorized as a Hierarchical
P2P Design.
Stewart identifies that the Overnet protocol is purely used for locational data; used by subnodes to
identify the location of supernodes and used by subcontrollers to identify the location of subnodes [33].
The Overnet protocol utilizes the Kademlia [34] algorithm, which functions as a Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) for file sharing purposes over UDP or TCP. A brief description of a DHT is presented in Appendix
A.1.1. Likewise, Peacomm too utilizes Kademlia as its method of searching, but manipulates it to allow
supernodes to publish its C&C socket to subnodes, and allow subnodes to function as search engines to
other subnodes and subcontrollers [6, 33, 47]. Each participant of the Overnet network used by Peacomm
stores other peer MD4 hashes (a unique peer identifier). The current date and a checksum value are
encoded into the peer MD4 hash for subnodes. The hash is published to the other subnodes, whose peer
MD4 hashes are close matches (as identified with a simple XOR function) to enable them to resolve the
location for that specific subnode. If a peer MD4 hash is unknown by a peer, a search will yield the peer
MD4 hash value of other subnodes that contain a close match (again, using an XOR function), and thus
will quickly locate the subnode.
The actual C&C communications are performed over HTTP, using several tiers of nodes to direct and
proxy communications [33]. As previously discussed, the socket of a supernode is made known to
subnodes using P2P relationships. C&C traffic to supernodes is encoded using Base64, compressed using
the zlib compression library, and is encapsulated in HTTP/1.1 POST requests. A challenge/response
authentication method is also invoked prior to HTTP communications ensuing between supernodes and
subnodes. Communications between the subcontroller layer and the C&C server vary slightly from these
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methods, as traffic may also be encrypted using the RSA cipher suite to secure the transmission of
locational data associated with active subcontrollers.
Peacomm leverages the use of double-flux DNS, at the supernode level of the hierarchy, to perform
name resolutions for subnodes. It also introduces a reverse proxy at the supernode level, which delivers
HTTP C&C communications to the subcontrollers [33] without revealing their location.
Observed Behavior
The variant of Peacomm that was downloaded was identified by SEP as Trojan.Peacomm.E. In what
appear to be Overnet-style connection requests, the malware begins generating outbound UDP traffic on
UDP/14507 to a series of remote hosts on random UDP ports immediately after being executed for the
first time (Table 16). With no responses to the UDP traffic, this variant provided very little additional data
to the prior information within the period of evaluation.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

140

39.128984

x.x.x.66

UDP

x.x.x.25

42

141

39.131857

x.x.x.66

UDP

x.x.x.2

42

142

39.133289

x.x.x.66

UDP

x.x.x.67

42

Source port: 14507
Destination port: 40125
[Malformed Packet]
Source port: 14507
Destination port: 40125
[Malformed Packet]
Source port: 14507
Destination port: 40125
[Malformed Packet]

<< Truncated >>
Table 16: A snippet of malformed UDP traffic directed at external nodes.

3.3.10 Phatbot
Expected Behavior
Phatbot initiates and accepts connections to/from other Phatbot peers to efficiently route C&C
communications. The WASTE protocol can be leveraged by Phatbot peers to participate in a partial mesh
network [37], using link-level encryption to secure the communications between only the participants of a
given WASTE session [14]. RSA is utilized as the method of session key exchange between participants
for encrypted communications, in addition to being the technology used for public key authentication.
WASTE encrypts the link using the Blowfish cipher in Propagating Cipher-block Chaining (PCBC) mode
to secure the data in transit. Internet-routable and private (RFC 1918) addresses are both capable of
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participating in the WASTE partial mesh topology [14], but will communicate in either an active or
passive capacity (respectively) for C&C communications.
Observed Behavior
The variant of Phatbot that was downloaded was identified by SEP as W32.HLLW.Gaobot.gen, which is
a signature description that covers Polybot variants as well [52]. During static analysis, TCP SYN
requests were initiated against remote IP addresses on TCP/4387 (Table 17). For the duration of the
evaluation, the malware attempted to connect to five different IP addresses over TCP/4387, but a threeway handshake never succeeded. The age of the malware and abandonment of WASTE is estimated to
have played a large factor in such limited results.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

252

79.909342

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.34

58

253

79.910353

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.92

58

254

79.914608

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.185

60

39487 > 4387 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
39487 > 4387 [SYN] Seq=0
Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
4387 > 39487 [RST, ACK] Seq=1
Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

<< Truncated >>
Table 17: TCP SYN probes against remote nodes using the native WASTE TCP port designation.

3.3.11 SDbot
Expected Behavior
Gu identifies SDbot as the first standalone and open-source botnet utilizing IRC for C&C purposes [5].
SDbot is bundled with its own custom IRC client, which is required to send and receive IRC C&C
communications over its Legacy Centralized architecture. During an initial bootstrapping process, SDbot
initiates an IRC connection to the IP address of a C&C server, which is hard-coded into the application,
and proceeds to download updated instructions. As described by Barford in [12], a bot performs an
automated connection process, joins a channel, and awaits announcements from the Botmaster. The
channel announcements honored by bots are limited to the KICK, NICK and PART/QUIT commands,
and the remainder of commands is delivered to bots through PRIVMSG, NOTICE or TOPIC messages
[12]. The extensive evaluation Gu et al. perform on IRC command obscurity [5] identifies that the IRC
channel utilized for SDbot is not encrypted, nor are the communications difficult to discern.
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Observed Behavior
The variant of SDbot that was downloaded was identified by SEP as Backdoor.IRC.SDbot, which is a
very broad categorization for a large family of malware, making it difficult to know the specifics of the
variant prior to infecting the victim (infection point). Upon infection, the malware immediately attempted
to contact a remote host to establish a socket on TCP/6667. Within five minutes of the initial TCP
connection request occurring, another request was initiated against a second remote host, again over
TCP/6667. Neither connection was established. To verify that this variant of SDbot was capable of
launching the IRC connection sequence to a remote host, a router was placed in front of the infected node
to perform inbound and outbound address translations to a known active and anonymous IRC server. The
two IP addresses observed from the initial (failed) connection requests were translated to a single IP of a
live IRC server, resulting in the bot attempting to perform its login routine; a NICK of {malade}-4343844
and USER of m4343844 were used in the connection request (Table 18). An expected IRC PING
message, as defined in RFC2812 [36] and outlined by Barford [12], was never received by the Bot, which
resulted in the connection attempt failing permanently. At a very minimum, this process revealed a
similar NICK naming convention that was identified by Goebel and Holz in [40] and confirmed the major
C&C transport protocols.
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

1022

1230.291838

x.x.x.66

IRC

x.x.x.86

114

Request (NICK) (USER)
NICK : {malade}-4343844
USER : m4343844

Table 18: The USER/NICK revealed when translating the original destination address to a known/active IRC server.

3.3.12 Sinit
Expected Behavior
Sinit utilizes the Full P2P Decentralized design, building relationships with other bots through internetwide port scans. Port scans are conducted through UDP/53 and check for the existence of other active
bots by probing open ports [22]. Bots utilize HTTP as the C&C transport medium, and fetch updated
versions of the Sinit client or C&C data using HTTP/1.1 GET requests over TCP/53 or a random, highnumbered TCP port. Sinit utilizes public key cryptography for authentication and encryption of data
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between peers [9, 23] prior to the download of updated information. Infected machines perform
connectivity checks against the random, high-numbered TCP ports to determine if the machine is
reachable from the Internet [22].
Observed Behavior
A Sinit binary could not be accurately identified by means of signature-based detection for the purpose of
research, limiting the research to a logical evaluation process.
3.3.13 Waledac
Expected Behavior
Waledac’s architecture is largely decentralized, but described by Nunnery as hierarchical due to the rolebased separation of duties amongst the infected hosts and the Botmaster-owned infrastructure [6]. This
malware is being classified in this work as utilizing a Next-generation Centralized design. C&C
communications require HTTP as the application protocol. Encoding of the HTTP traffic is performed
using the Base64 encoding scheme, and the payload is compressed and encrypted. HTTP traffic is sent
and received over TCP/80 and uses double-flux name resolution to retrieve C&C instructions from a
subcontroller [6]. Calvet identifies that Waledac binaries are hardcoded with a list of 100-500 unique
FQDNs or IP addresses for known supernodes (repeaters) [43]. Multiple supernodes are contacted for
C&C instructions and to gather an updated list of other supernodes.
The takedown efforts by Microsoft [55, 56] for the infrastructure of Waledac in 2010 give reason to
believe that limited results will be achieved through manual evaluation. Due to the nature of malware, and
the time that has passed manual evaluation was still performed to collect further data about the malware.
Observed Behavior
The variant of malware was identified as W32.Waledac.C by SEP. Initial signs of C&C behavior were
evident in the packet trace through a series of TCP three-way handshakes to seemingly random FQDNs
on TCP/80. This behavior differs from the initial behavior described by Symantec [54], as it established a
connection to several remote hosts rather than waiting for commands. The machine did, however, begin
listening on TCP/80 for incoming connections. Within the period of evaluation a single download
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occurred using a HTTP/1.1 GET request against a file with a .EXE extension, but the machine remained
dormant following this download (Table 19).
No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

1007
1008

1079.909342
1079.910353

x.x.x.66
x.x.x.31

HTTP
TCP

x.x.x.31
x.x.x.66

534
1514

GET /runes123.exe HTTP/1.1
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

1518

1079.914608

x.x.x.31

HTTP

<< Truncated >>
421
x.x.x.66

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
msdos-program)

(application/x-

Table 19: HTTP/1.1 GET request and subsequent download of executable file.

3.3.14 Zeus
Expected Behavior
The bots created from various distributions of Zeus have different feature sets, so expectations were
minimal. The Zeus variant was expected to communicate in a Next-generation Centralized design, using
HTTP as its C&C transport mechanism, based upon the information from the Zeus Tracker project [57].
Observed Behavior
The variant of malware was identified as Trojan.Zbot by SEP. It initiated a TCP connection against a
remote host using TCP/80 and successfully completed a three-way handshake (Table 20). During this
process, no name lookups occurred, and only a single remote host was communicated with. Immediately
following the handshake, a HTTP/1.1 GET request was issued to download a file with a .BIN file
extension (Table 21) and then proceeded to download a file with a .EXE file extension (Table 22). The
downloaded .BIN file was presumably an updated instruction file, but its contents were encrypted with an
unknown cipher. The .EXE file was an installation package for the AV Security 2012 rogue-security
software, which was revealed when the package was executed and launched on the infection point.
Further analysis of the HTTP payload associated with the download of AV Security 2012 revealed several
commands being appended to the payload as data padding (Table 23). The only further C&C
communications observed during the evaluation were periodic check-ins to the remote host, with
HTTP/1.1 POST requests against a file with a .PHP file extension. Due to the very simplistic nature of
this variant, it is suspected that the malware is utilizing a Legacy Centralized Design for C&C
communications as opposed to the expectations.
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No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

12

11.854251

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.20

62

13

12.219794

x.x.x.20

TCP

x.x.x.66

62

14

12.221962

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.20

60

1052 > http [SYN] Seq=0
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK_PERM=1
http > 1052 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1372
SACK_PERM=1
1052 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=64484 Len=0

Table 20: Three-way TCP handshake with remote C&C host

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

15
16

12.223935
12.444535

x.x.x.66
x.x.x.20

HTTP
TCP

x.x.x.20
x.x.x.66

220
54

17

12.449296

x.x.x.66

TCP

x.x.x.66

1426

GET /nbren.bin HTTP/1.1
http > 1052 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=166
Win=6432 Len=0
[TCP segment of a reassembled
PDU]

56

13.535691

x.x.x.20

HTTP/DL

<< Truncated >>
1265
x.x.x.66

unknown (0xa7)
[Message: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n]

Table 21: HTTP/1.1 GET request for a file with a .BIN extension

No.

Time

Source

Prot.

Destination

Len.

Info

173
174

130.885970
131.105633

x.x.x.66
x.x.x.20

HTTP
TCP

x.x.x.20
x.x.x.66

219
54

175

131.111460

x.x.x.20

TCP

197

131.925387

x.x.x.20

HTTP/DL

1426
x.x.x.66
<< Truncated >>
1162
x.x.x.66

GET /loader.exe HTTP/1.1
http > 1054 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=165
Win=6432 Len=0
[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
unknown (0x4d)
[Message: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n]

Table 22: Executable file download from remote host, presumably containing AV Security 2012.

KERNEL32.DLL...GetLastError...GetModuleHandleA... LoadLibraryA.2.FreeLibrary.D.VirtualProtect.
.ExitProcess....USER32.DLL...CloseWindow...SwitchToThisWindow.................................
................................................................................|K...P........
.......(...@...8...D.......k...............Z...g...s.......
vhgqn.dll.EndHyaessfre.ReadRqonhxb.InitYsyliubvg.Petugd
Table 23: Functions padded into the payload of the executable file download from Table 22.
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3.4 Complexity Matrix

Application
Protocols

Transport
Protocols

Evasion Tactics

Encryption Methods

Authentication &
High Availability & Fault Tolerance
0n-Repudiation

Architecture

C&C Characteristics

AgoBot

AsProx

Bagle

Bobax

Conficker

iKee

GTbot

Nugache

Peacomm

Phatbot

Sdbot

Sinit

Waledac

Zeus

Centralized

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

Decentralized

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

Role Based Separation of Duties

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

Uses Distributed Computing

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

At least 1 Intermediary 0de

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

More than 1 Intermediary 0des

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

Uses a Domain Generation Algorithm

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Uses Single-flux DNS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Uses Double-flux DNS

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

Uses List of 0des

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

Uses Hash Table of 0de Locations

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

Dynamically Updates List of 0des

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

Dynamically Updates List of Hashes

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

Performs Connectivity Checks

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Automatically Builds Relationships

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

Requires Authentication

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Digitally Signs Messages

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

Uses Challenge/Response Authentication

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

Payload Encryption

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

Instruction File Encryption

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

End-to-End Encryption

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Link-Layer Encryption

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Generates Arbitrary Traffic

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Pads Instructions into Protocol Payload

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Obscures Commands

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Hides Instructions in Flat File

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

Encodes Payload

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

Compresses Payload

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

Uses TCP

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Uses UDP

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

Uses HTTP (includes HTTPS)

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

Uses IRC

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Uses WASTE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Uses Overnet

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Uses Custom Protocol

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Complexity Score

5

14

8

11

16

5

7

13

19

12

5

11

19

12

Dates of Inception or Discovery

2002

2007

2004

2004

2009

2000

2008
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2006

2007

2003

2002

2003

2008

2012

Architecture

3.4.1 C&C Characteristic Definitions
C&C Characteristics
Centralized

Definition

Decentralized

Botnet utilizes a decentralized design.
Infected nodes are capable of serving different purposes in a botnet
hierarchy.
Harnesses the computing power of other infected nodes to
collectively perform a process or processes (e.g. searching).
At least 1 intermediary node is performing C&C functions between
a subnode (bot) and a C&C master.
More than 1 intermediary nodes are performing C&C functions
between a subnode (bot) and a C&C master.
Utilizes an algorithm for generating domain names, specifically
those domain names used for C&C communications.
Utilizes single-flux DNS to resolve C&C infrastructure elements
(refer to A.1.3).
Utilizes double-flux DNS to resolve C&C infrastructure elements
(refer to A.1.4).
Bots retain a list of nodes used in C&C communications, in the form
of peers or masters (depending on design type).
Bots retain a hash table of node locations for identifying other
nodes used in C&C communications (refer to A.1.1).
Bots are capable of updating node lists (used for C&C
communications) on their own.
Bots are capable of updating hash tables (used for C&C location
information) on their own.
Performs checks for connectivity to identify:
 Outbound connectivity to the Internet
 Outbound/inbound communication ports
 Access to C&C resources
Automatically identifies relationships with peers or masters
(depending on design) for C&C communications.
C&C communications only occur after authentication between
botnet members occurs.
Messages used in C&C communications are digitally signed to verify
the sender’s identity.

Role Based Separation of Duties
Uses Distributed Computing
At least 1 Intermediary Node
More than 1 Intermediary Nodes
Uses a Domain Generation Algorithm

High Availability & Fault Tolerance

Uses Single-flux DNS
Uses Double-flux DNS
Uses List of Nodes
Uses Hash Table of Node Locations
Dynamically Updates List of Nodes
Dynamically Updates List of Hashes

Performs Connectivity Checks

Authentication &
Non-Repudiation

Automatically Builds Relationships
Requires Authentication
Digitally Signs Messages
Uses Challenge/Response
Authentication

Botnet utilizes a centralized design.

C&C communications only occur after a challenge/response
authentication routine succeeds.
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Encryption Methods

Payload Encryption

Instruction File Encryption
End-to-End Encryption

Link-Layer Encryption

Evasion Tactics

Generates Arbitrary Traffic

Pads Instructions into Protocol Payload

Obscures Commands
Hides Instructions in Flat File
Encodes Payload

Transport
Protocols

Compresses Payload
Uses TCP
Uses UDP

Application Protocols

Uses HTTP (includes HTTPS)
Uses IRC
Uses WASTE
Uses Overnet
Uses Custom Protocol

The payload of the C&C communications is encrypted and requires
a decryption routine to be run when the communications are
processed by the recipient. The entire transport protocol is not
encrypted, however.
C&C instructions are provided in an instruction file that must be
decrypted prior to reading from it.
Encryption is used to secure a C&C communications channel
between sender and receiver. Only the sender and receiver are
intended to decrypt the communications.
Encryption is used to secure an entire domain of nodes. C&C
communications can be encrypted and decrypted by all members
of the encryption domain (e.g. all participants). Non-participants
cannot communicate in the encryption domain.
Botnet members generate meaningless network traffic to confuse
a researcher.
Instructions for carrying out a given task are padded in the
protocol payload in addition to other content (e.g. updated bot
binary). The task is carried out after the recipient processes the
communications.
C&C commands do not follow a typical or standard format, by
means of manipulating a protocol message format.
C&C instructions are provided in an instruction file.
The payload of C&C transactions are encoded prior to transmission
and must be decoded by the recipient.
The payload of C&C transactions are compressed prior to
transmission and must be inflated by the recipient.
Utilizes the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as the primary
transport protocol for C&C communications.
Utilizes the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the primary transport
protocol for C&C communications.
Utilizes the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or HTTP Secure
(HTTPS) as the primary application protocols for C&C
communications.
Utilizes Internet Relay Chat (IRC) as the primary application
protocol for C&C communications.
Utilizes the P2P protocol WASTE as the primary application
protocol for C&C communications.
Utilizes the P2P protocol Overnet as the primary application
protocol for C&C communications.
Utilizes a custom protocol (e.g. non-standard) for C&C
communications.
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4. Historical Data
In this thesis, logical elements of C&C communications are identified and used to characterize various
botnets. A complexity matrix was then created for the chosen botnets, and the hypothesis that botnets are
becoming more complex over time is verified.
Historical data is used to quickly illustrate trends in malware complexity. A complexity score will be
used to define the C&C complexity associated with a given botnet variant.

4.1 Complexity Score
By graphing the complexity scores created from the CM, it is possible to illustrate the changes in botnet
complexity relative to an inception or discovery date (Fig. 6). The average of multiple complexity scores
is used in Fig. 6 when multiple botnet variants exist for a given year.
Due to the infancy of mobile botnets, a drop in complexity is identified in 2009 with the logical
evaluation of the iKee botnet. Also, another unexpected value is seen in 2012, which represents the
unsophisticated variant of Zbot (Zeus) that was used in the evaluation.
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Figure 6: Botnet C&C complexity scores relative to date of inception or discovery of the particular variant of malware
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5. Limitations & Future Work
This thesis evaluates a broad range of C&C methods employed by malware, but specific limitations exist
in this research. The work presented is based upon static network traffic analysis and prior malware case
studies; it does not utilize the advanced methods of malware deconstruction presented in prior research.
Additionally, ideal conditions for manually evaluating a majority of the botnet examples were not present
due to the degradation or removal of core C&C infrastructure elements.
Encrypting data at rest and in transit presents a challenge in identifying the core components of C&C
communications. A significant number of the botnet selections utilized encryption for hiding C&C
components, making static analysis limited in scope. Reverse engineering and real-time memory analysis
make it possible to deconstruct encrypted C&C components. These methods were not employed in the
evaluation phase of the work, and as such it relies on the credibility of prior research.
The proliferation of mobile devices has fueled the creation of malware for mobile platforms, which
was not heavily discussed in this survey and subsequent evaluation. The single example, iKee, is an
example of botnet behavior in its infancy. The topic of mobile platforms creating a larger canvas for
botnets is thus left for future work.
The selected malware had 42.8% success rate of connecting to C&C resources during the manual
evaluations. The limited results are caused by the age of the malware, environmental factors affecting key
C&C infrastructure components, and the inability for the malware to recover from failure.
Due to the evaluation of some antiquated botnet variants, a manual approach of gathering the malware
is used over an automated Honeypot/Honeynet design. A process for automation in this regard is left to
future work as well.
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6. Conclusion
Methods of C&C communications have vastly changed over time. Every aspect of C&C communications,
from the architecture to advanced features of high-availability, is changing to evade detection. On a large
scale, C&C communications are becoming more complex over time. The re-use of aging technologies or
C&C approaches indicates that limited success is still possible without evolving, but it doesn’t reap the
benefits that more sophisticated approaches will for a Botmaster.
In testing, limited results were acquired with a manual evaluation of the selected variants of malware.
Thus, it becomes difficult to evaluate malware of yesterday purely through observation. A collaborative
effort is better leveraged to identify the idiosyncrasies that comprise a given botnet.
An approach at categorizing C&C features into a matrix proved useful, as the existence of specific
features can accurately measure its complexity relative to prior malware and its creation date. Though
legacy approaches at C&C still remain effective under specific circumstances, they ultimately will not
achieve the same level of utility for affecting a large audience. Complexity in C&C techniques and the
infrastructure that supports a botnet will ultimately impact its longevity, and an upward trend in
complexity throughout history is clearly visible with the advent of a Complexity Matrix.
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A. Appendix
A.1 Definitions
Specific feature definitions are provided here due to their significance. The features have been clearly
identified in prior work and are being summarized below for reference purposes. The presence or absence
of these features is also used to categorize the sophistication of a botnet in the CM.
A.1.1 Distributed Hash Table
Ghodsi defines a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) as hash table distributed amongst a set of cooperating
computers [31]. The hash table is used to store key/value pairs, to identify the location of a given
resource. Searching across a set of cooperating computers is conducted to locate resources. Searching for
a specific key will yield a given value, and the participating node that possesses the information on the
searched resource will return the value or a pointer to another node with the value. This approach has
been leveraged for file sharing services, such as BitTorrent, and has become useful in P2P malware as
well.
A.1.2 Domain Generation Algorithm
A domain generation algorithm (DGA) is a computational method of generating FQDNs [31]. In terms of
C&C communications, malware may utilize a DGA mechanism to create the FQDNs of C&C peers or
masters (depending on the C&C topology). The DGA must be crafted in a manner that allows it to
produce the same FQDNs for the individual responsible for registering the domain names. A DGA may
not generate FQDNs in the same order when run, but it will be predictable to a certain degree. A malware
author may perform the work of registering the domain names created by the DGA well in advance of the
malware being distributed to enable it to quickly communicate with remote hosts behind seemingly
random FQDNs. Malware can thus attempt connections to the FQDNs generated by an internal DGA
until it discovers a domain that resolves to an IP address. The predictable FQDN generation techniques
can also be utilized by researchers to identify domain names that will be used by a particular variant of
malware prior to its registration with a registrar.
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A.1.3 Single-flux DNS
Single-flux DNS refers to a method of overloading an Address (A) record in DNS with multiple IP
addresses and very short time to live (TTL) values [10, 41]. The combination of these two features
enables multiple IP addresses to be resolved from a single FQDN. Authoritative responses to name
lookups can return a multitude of different IP addresses due to the round-robin behavior that occurs as a
result of short TTL values. Malware authors utilize this functionality within botnets to build resiliency
and redundancy into their C&C design and overcome the connectivity issues associated with utilizing
single points of failure.
Additional advents to this technology could include overloading A records by means of dynamic
registration with a rogue name server. This process allows other infected nodes to perform the duties of
A record updates.
A.1.4 Double-flux DNS
Double-flux DNS builds upon the original idea of Single-flux DNS, but overloads the A records that map
to NS records for a particular DNS zone [10, 41]. The result of such resource record overloading produces
a large number of name servers for a zone. The remote host corresponding to a NS record at any point in
time may purely be used to proxy a DNS lookup request to a true authoritative name server. By restricting
the visibility of authoritative name servers to the remote hosts that proxy the DNS lookups, an
authoritative name server can remain hidden from others.
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